NK. Omitting the rhetoric….

A quick thought on this tete-a tete between the two, it strikes that the nation that is at most risk is SK. Missiles, both nuclear and non-nuclear,
sit barely, what, 30 miles from the DMZ to the south’s capital.

Massive troop levels as well. The troops could be disrupted fairly easily by air assets, one would think. The big issue is the missiles. That falls
back to the THAAD systems.

My understanding was SK ‘suspended’ the deployment of the THAADS. Perhaps they felt the THAADS would empower a war, either from NK fear or U.S.
‘confidence’ in winning without significant damage to the south.

Suspending the deployment, if the wording is correct, doesn’t mean the systems aren’t ready for deployment, or pre-placed in sufficient numbers th
negate NK missiles. However, if those missiles aren’t deployed the damage to the south could be catastrophic.

Yet U.S. concerns are no longer in just protecting SK. With the continued development of ICBMs the threat is to the U.S., as well.

How willing is the U.S. to provoke massive damage to SK to negate the threat to the U.S,?

Is it safe to bet that the U.S. cannot move without the THAADS well in place? Is it possible that the south backs NK in avoidance of a war that could
cripple them as much or more than the north??

Could sea assets intercept any and all outbound ICBMs from NK and with a constant presence thereby avoid the need to take the NK leadership out??

As NK is squeezed economically more and more, do they ‘pre-empt’? Is an internal coup in the north even possible??

Many questions? Any answers?


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